China's Economic Rise & Its Potential Implications on the World Economic Order as We Know It

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For the National Academy of Public Administration
(Oct 16, 2019)

Note: *The views expressed in this presentation do not represent those of the USITC or any of its individual Commissioners*

Agenda

- How Fast is China Growing?
- Why Has it Grown so Fast?
- Is it a Rival or Partner to the U.S.?
- Implications of its Rise on the Global Economic Order
- Implications for the Policy Tools the U.S. Traditionally Uses to Address Unfair Trade Practices

1. How Fast is China Growing?


Real GDP Growth
Real GDP Growth
(Avg 1978-2018)
China 9.5
20
15
10
5
0
-5
-10
-15
(in percent)
Source: World Bank Development Indicators
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018

Real GDP Growth

Real GDP Growth (Avg 1978-2018)	
Brazil	2.5
Russia	0.8
India	5.9
China	9.5
South Africa	2.3
USA	2.6
World	2.9



Share of World GDP

Share of World GDP	1978	2018	Change
Brazil	2.3	2.2	-0.1
Russia	2.9*	1.9	-1.0
India	1.6	3.2	1.6
China	1.7	15.9	14.2
South Africa	0.6	0.4	-0.2
USA	27.4	23.9	-3.5

* Russia earliest start period 1988



GDP at Purchasing Power Parity
(Share of World Total)



Source: IMF's World Economic Outlook (Apr 2019)

GDP Per Capital

(in thousands $U.S.)

GDP Per Capital	1980	2018	2026
U.S. > China	41	7	5
U.S. > China (PPP)	40	3	3



Source: IMF's World Economic Outlook (Apr 2019)

2. How Did China Grow So Fast?

2. How Did China Grow So Fast?

- **Improved Resource Allocation (<u>ended AG reliance</u>)**
- **Careful, Experimental, and Nimble <u>Planning</u>**
  -Opposing ideologies ok, "Growing Out of Plan" (Naughton)
- **Became Global <u>Manufacturing</u> Hub**
  -Assemble, Export, & Become GVC Glue
- **↑ FDI, "Learned" Technology, Now Leading <u>Innovation</u>?**
- **<u>Expanded Outwards</u> for Resources & Markets**

Evolved From Agrarian Society



Composition of China's GDP (Production Side)			
	1950	1978	2018
AG (Primary)	50%	28%	7%
Industry (Secondary)	21%	48%	41%
Services (Tertiery)	29%	25%	52%

Source: China's National Bureau of Statistics (through CEIC)

Careful Planning (Medium-Term)





Careful Planning (Long-Term)



Ten core industries set the basis of Made in China 2025

China has set ambitious targets



Main steps	Milestones
2025	Major manufacturing power
2035	Global manufacturing power
2049	Leading manufacturing superpower

Source: State Council

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

Growing Out of the Plan



SOE Trade: Down But Not Out

Figure 1 China's Merchandise Trade by SOEs and Non-SOEs



Figure 3. Broad Chinese Export Sectors with Highest SOE Contributions (2015)

2015		Iron & Steel	Mineral Fuels & Oils	Ships & Boats	Fertilizer	Rail, Loco-motives & Parts	Air/Space-Craft & Parts
	SOE Export Value	$19.7 Bil	$17.2 Bil	$14.2 Bil	$4.9 Bil	$3.6 Bil	$1.5 Bil
	SOE Share of Chinese Exports (in Same Category)	40.1%	61.7%	49.3%	45.4%	28.8%	43.1%

From Hammer and Jones, "SOEs Play a Smaller, But Still Strategic, Role in China's External Sector" Jan 2018

Built a Global Manufacturing Hub



Built a Global Manufacturing Hub



Lead Innovation?

R&D Expenditures (in % of GDP)



Global Patent Applications (in % of Total)



From "The Mysterious Divergence in China's Productivity and Innovation Patterns" (Bernard and Hammer, Aug 2019)

Expand Outward



3. Is China a Partner or Rival to U.S.?

Partner
U.S. Consumer Welfare
Major Investor
Largest Consumer Growth Market
Foreign Invested Enterprises
Manufacturing Offshoring
Global Value Chain Partner
“Stable” Trade Partner

Ambiguous
Trade Balance
Currency Valuation
Treasury Bonds
Manufacturing: **Jobs vs. Productivity/High-Tech Focus**

Rival
Unfair Competition in China (e.g. SOEs)
Unfair Trade (e.g., AD, CVD)
IP Infringement & Forced Tech Transfer
Internationalization of FX
Innovation Race
Securing Global Resources
FDI & Soft Power



The US-China merchandise trade balance reached $419 bil in 2018 (before real trade war effects kicked in)



…far surpassing other major trade partners.



FIEs are playing an important role in China's exports to the U.S. ….



…FIEs also playing an important role in China's imports from the U.S. ….



Source: USITC & China Customs

U.S. firms finding cost advantages in manufacturing, selling, and even doing R&D in China.



The majority of workers of U.S. affiliates in China are in the computer (semiconductor) sector.



U.S. imports from Asia remained fairly flat in past 2 decades…



..but their composition is totally different.



So companies no longer doing this, but importing directly from China



New Manufacturing Trends (Apple)

Given lower final assembly costs in China, companies (e.g., Apple, Dell computers) are doing more final assembly in China



China holds over $1 trillion $U.S. reserves (18.8% of total, and 4th highest after Japan, Caymen Islands, UK).

However, selloff would likely harm China more (needs stable investment).

China's Holdings of U.S. Treasury Securities: 2002-2017

($ in billions)



Source: U.S. Department of the Treasury.

Notes: Data are year-end and exclude Hong Kong and Macau, which are treated separately.

Source: CRS (Morrison), "China-U.S. Trade Issues", July 30 2018

U.S. Manufacturing Jobs ↓, BUT Manufacturing Output & High-Tech Specialization ↑



From "Why Have U.S. Firms Offshored to China?" (Hammer, Jun 2017)

IP Infringement from Chinese Entities: Real & Consequential

FIGURE ES.1 U.S. IP-intensive firms that reported IPR infringement in China accounted for 58.1 percent of the total sales of firms in the U.S. IP-intensive economy that were conducting business in China, 2009



Sources: Weighted responses to the USITC questionnaire; U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis; U.S. Census Bureau.

TABLE ES.2 Summary of potential U.S. gains from IPR improvement in China (based on statistical and simulation analysis)

	Amount (point estimate[a])
Economic gains from statistical analysis	
Exports of goods and services to China	$21.4 billion
Goods	$9.4 billion
Services	$11.9 billion
Receipts of royalties and license fees from China	$3.0 billion
Other services	$8.9 billion
Sales of U.S. majority-owned affiliates in China	$87.8 billion
U.S. exports to affiliate firms in China (subtracted)[b]	$2.1 billion
Total increase in U.S. exports to China and sales to U.S. affiliates in China[b]	**$107.0 billion**
Net income of affiliates (profits)[c]	$3.5 billion
Economic gains from simulation analysis	
Fixed employment scenario:[d]	
U.S. economic welfare	$6.7 billion
U.S. profits (as reflected by returns to capital)[c]	$12.3 billion
U.S. net employment effect (in full-time equivalents or FTEs)	Unchanged (by definition)
Illustrations of potential labor reallocation to more IP-intensive sectors (FTEs):	
Education and related services	26,000
Recreational and other services (e.g., motion picture production, recorded music)	17,000
Business services	11,000
Software, paper products, and publishing	6,000
Flexible employment scenario:[e]	
U.S. economic welfare	$185.2 billion
U.S. profits (as reflected by returns to capital)[c]	$62.1 billion
U.S. net employment effect (in FTEs)	2.1 million

Source: Compiled and estimated by the Commission.

Innovation Race?

R&D Expenditures (in % of GDP)



Global Patent Applications (in % of Total)



From "The Mysterious Divergence in China's Productivity and Innovation Patterns" (Bernard and Hammer, Aug 2019)

4. Implications of China’s Rise on the Global Economic Order as We Know it

Most Economists Quibble Over When, Not if, China Will Surpass U.S. (Nominal) GDP



Figure 5 - GDP of emerging powers showing dramatic projected growth for India and China. Source: Goldman Sachs



High Tech Manufacturing: Not Just a U.S. Issue





Focus on advanced technologies

Key sectors targeted by Made in China 2025

- New generation information technology
- High-end computerised machines and robots
- Space and aviation
- Maritime equipment and high-tech ships
- Advanced railway transportation equipment
- New energy and energy-saving vehicles
- Energy equipment
- Agricultural machines
- New materials
- Biopharma and high-tech medical devices

SOE Industrial Output Back on Rise



China: Lending By Enterprise Type

(in percent of total)



Source: China Banking Society and *The State Strikes Back (Lardy, 2019)*

Other Implications?













5. Implications for the Policy Tools the U.S. Traditionally Uses to Address Unfair Trade Practices

Share of U.S. Imports Subject to AD/CVD Orders



Bown 2017



* ROW indicates investigations that do not include Chinese firms, while China indicates investigations that include Chinese firms, but may also include ROW firms

Source: USITC

China's represents a major share (more than 50%) of AD investigations.



Source: USITC

China's represents a major share (more than 50%) of CVD investigations.



Source: USITC

…same is true for IP related investigations.

US-China WTO Disputes, 2002-18

Case Status	Complainant	
	United States	China
WTO Cases	23	15
Settled Early	9	1
Ruling for Complainant	10	4
Ruling for Respond	0	1
Split Decision	0	3
Pending	4	6

SECTION 301 OF TRADE ACT OF 1974

- **Section 301** establishes domestic procedures that allow US companies and unions to petition USTR to enforce US rights under international trade agreements and eliminate unfair foreign government trade practices that adversely affect US investment and exports of goods and services.

- USTR can self initiate

- USTR required to take appropriate action to remove foreign government policies or practices that violates a bilateral or multilateral trade agreement or are "unreasonable, unjustifiable, or discriminatory" and "burdens or restricts US commerce."

SECTION 301 (continued)

- If foreign unfair practices are not eliminated through successful WTO dispute settlement or negotiations, USTR can retaliate against the foreign country.

- Retaliation can take the form of suspending the benefits of trade concessions previously granted by the United States (i.e., tariffs) or other restrictions or fees on the trade of the offending nation.

Thank you!